Interests vs. Positions: Guidelines for “Getting to Yes” and Avoiding Negotiation Jiu-Jitsu

Posted: November 29th, 2021

By: Joe Campolo, Esq. email

There is a single orange sitting on a kitchen table and two sisters want it. What is the solution to appease both sisters?

  1. You can split the orange in half and give one half to each sister.
  2. The older sister can receive the whole orange.
  3. Flip a coin, and the winning sister will receive the whole orange.

Let’s say you split the orange in half to be fair to both sisters. Now, each sister has half of an orange. The younger sister proceeds to eat her half, but still feels hungry afterward. She throws the peel in the garbage. The older sister uses her half to zest the peel and make an orange cake. She has no use for the orange itself, so she throws it out. In the attempt to make it fair for the sisters by giving them each half of the orange, we’ve just committed a crucial negotiation error: we’ve assumed each sister’s position and incorrectly guessed their interests.

If we asked the older sister what she wanted to do with the orange, she might have said she needed the peel for her cake. If we asked the younger sister why she needed the orange, she might have replied that she wanted a snack. If we had asked these questions, we would have discovered a fourth solution to appease both sisters: one receives the peel, and one receives the fruit itself. A win-win scenario.

Of course, not every negotiation is this simple. However, understanding the difference between a person’s interests and positions could be the difference between negotiation success
or a miserable flop. A win-win negotiation is one in which both parties find alignment between their interests to create value for both sides. A negotiator’s position might be what they want (an orange), but their interest is why they want it (to eat it or use to make a cake).

In one of my previous negotiation blogs, I discussed how to utilize active listening as a powerful negotiation tool to gather information. Now, you can use active listening to gather information, and then determine a solution that aligns with the interests of both parties. Roger Fisher and William Ury outline this in their book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.

Here are some key considerations to find alignment:

Ask “why” and separate positions from interests

As in the orange example, don’t assume the opposing party’s position to be their underlying interest. Let’s consider an example that Fisher and Ury highlight in their book:

Two men disagree about a window: one wants it open, while the other one wants it closed. They go back and forth on leaving it open, closed, halfway shut, slightly ajar, and so on. Then a third person walks into the room and asks why the first man wants the window open. He replies that he wanted some fresh air. The third person asks the second man why he wants the window closed. He replies that he wanted to avoid the draft. The third person thinks for a moment and then proceeds to open a window in the next room, bringing in fresh air while avoiding the draft at the same time: a win-win.

When you find out the “why,” aka underlying interests, of the parties involved in a negotiation, it’s easier to find what both parties value to create a win-win scenario.

Ditch the “winner vs. loser” mentality

Too often, negotiations are viewed in black and white terms: there is a loser and a winner, and the name of the game is to “win.” Emotions run rampant, and the negotiation plays out with a “you vs. them” undercurrent. When this happens, try to frame issues as an open discussion in which the opposing party feels comfortable with you.

For example, if you’re trying to negotiate with the seller of a building you are buying, try not to get locked into a game of negotiation jiu-jitsu in which there’s a cycle of action and reaction. This happens when the seller names their price, you refuse and go lower, then they refuse and maintain their original price without budging. This mentality creates a situation where you as the buyer think the only way to win is to lock in the low price. Instead, try looking at the bigger picture and address the basic concerns of the opposing party.

Perhaps the building has issues with the roof or needs a structural upgrade. These discussions could be steered toward a suggestion for the current owner in which you imply that they are better off selling the building to you at a lower price than fixing it themselves. By framing it this way, both you and the current building owner could feel like winners.

Have your BATNA ready

We’ve talked about BATNA before on this blog. Fisher and Ury coined the term, which stands for “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.” Essentially, it’s a Plan B to provide negotiating power and serves as your bottom line in a negotiation. Having a BATNA at the ready helps you avoid doing negotiation jiu-jitsu in which you go back and forth with your counterpart until there is no solution to be found.

Let’s use the example of a car salesman and a would-be purchaser. If the person trying to buy a car wants to spend around $20,000 but would pay no more than $25,000, that means their BATNA is $25,000: the worst-case scenario that would still lead to a successful negotiation and outcome for both parties involved. For the salesman, their goal could be to sell a car for $27,000 but their BATNA could be $22,000. Therefore, if the salesman and the person interested in the car negotiate with their BATNAs in mind, the car could be sold for somewhere between $22,000 and $25,000.

In Summary


Distinguishing what someone wants and why they want it, using win-win tactics, and having a BATNA prepared can help you avoid negotiation jiu-jitsu to gain a favorable outcome for both yourself and your negotiation counterpart. The next time you find yourself locked in a negotiation that seems like it has no end, try to dig deeper and uncover the underlying interests of the person you are negotiating with. You might find a hidden path to “getting to yes.”

NYSDOL Issues New Guidance on Adult Use Cannabis and the Workplace

Posted: November 8th, 2021

By: Arthur Yermash, Esq. email

Tags: ,

Can an employer take action against an employee for using cannabis on the job, prohibit cannabis possession in the workplace, or drug test for cannabis? These are just some of the many questions that employers and employees have been wondering since the legalization of adult-use marijuana in New York State on March 31 via the Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA).

CMM previously reported on the legalization of marijuana in April, taking a look at the new legislation and the workplace concerns of many employers and employees. Now, the New York State Department of Labor (NYSDOL) has issued an FAQ addressing some of these concerns with concrete answers for common situations and questions regarding adult-use cannabis and the workplace. Here are some highlights.

Discrimination

The FAQ reiterates that the MRTA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on the use of cannabis outside of the workplace and outside of work hours. However, it’s important to note that employees are only protected if they are over the age of 21 since the sale, use, or transportation of cannabis by individuals under the age of 21 is still illegal in New York State. The law does not explicitly require employers to report or fire employees under the age of 21 using cannabis on the job or discipline them in any way, but an employer can take action if they choose to.

An employer is also permitted to take action against an employee if an employer would be in violation of federal law, lose a federal contract or federal funding, or be unable to provide a safe and healthy workplace as required by state and federal workplace safety laws.

Articulable Symptoms of Impairment

Employers are also permitted to take employment action if an employee has “articulable symptoms” of cannabis impairment that impacts their performance on the job. The FAQ does not provide a list of what “articulable symptoms” of cannabis impairment are, instead describing the symptoms as “observable indications” that an employee’s performance has decreased or lessened. However, the FAQ cautions employers that articulable symptoms should not be confused with a disability protected by federal and state law.

Drug Testing of Employees

The FAQ states that employers are not permitted to test for cannabis unless federal or state law requires drug testing as a mandatory requirement of the position (for example: mandatory drug testing for drivers of commercial motor vehicles).

Also, when it comes to drug testing as a basis for an “articulable symptom” of impairment, a test for cannabis usage “cannot serve as a basis for an employer’s conclusion that an employee was impaired by the use of cannabis, since such tests do not currently demonstrate impairment.” Additionally, employers cannot fire employees for the smell of cannabis alone.

Use at Work or During Work Hours

The FAQ makes it clear that employers are allowed to prohibit cannabis during work hours including paid and unpaid breaks such as lunchtime or when an employee leaves the worksite and then returns. Employers can also prohibit employees from bringing cannabis onto the property including at an employee’s desk or in a locker. If an employee is caught using cannabis on the job, it’s the employer’s decision whether to permit the employee to keep working or to take employment action. For more guidance as the NYDOL continues to develop its Office of Cannabis Management (OCM) and the rules and regulations surrounding the adult-use industry, please contact our Cannabis Law practice area chair, CMM Partner Arthur Yermash.

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

OPINION: How Municipalities Can Expand Public Engagement by Going Hybrid

Posted: October 13th, 2021

By: Scott Middleton, Esq. email

Tags:

For those who hoped never to hear the phrase “new normal” again
 we’re not there yet.

Yes, we are getting back to a “new normal” as the pandemic continues on. And while the Delta variant is posing continued challenges, many in-person activities have resumed. But for municipalities, with new updates to the New York State Open Meetings Law, maybe a hybrid style model is the best way to expand public engagement and follow the new guidelines.

New York Open Meetings Law

Governing state and local government meetings is a piece of legislation that covers public bodies such as municipalities. Known as the New York Open Meetings Law, or OML, Section 103 of the Public Officer’s Law states that public bodies at the state and local level in New York must give notice of meetings and allow the general public to attend at a facility that permits barrier-free physical access.

According to Section 102 of the OML, public bodies are defined as any entity that requires a quorum to “conduct public business and which consists of two or more members, performing a governmental function for the state or for an agency or department thereof.” Therefore, a public body is any state, county, or municipal government. And a quorum means a majority of body members needed to take formal action of matters of public business.

Essentially, the OML gives citizens the right to attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy in an open and public manner, enabling them to educate themselves on current legislation and observe the performance of public officials.

New York State Response to COVID-19 and the OML

On March 12, 2020, former Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.1. The order suspended the requirement that members of a public body physically convene; now, teleconferencing was permitted. Therefore, instead of providing a meeting location where the public could gather, if a municipality wanted to host a meeting, the Executive Order mandated that the municipality had to provide remote access to the general public.

In addition to suspending certain requirements such as an in-person and physical location, some new requirements were also established for the duration of the Executive Order 202.1 such as recording and transcribing meetings.

OML Fully Functioning Again?

On June 25, 2021, the State Disaster Emergency ended, removing the provision that suspended the Open Meetings Law. So this summer, the aspects of the OML related to in-person attendance (that were previously suspended) went back in effect.

Many municipalities found the shift back to in-person meetings startling. When the pandemic began, it had been a challenge for many municipal and state boards to gain familiarity with platforms such as Zoom. However, many members of the general public attending the meetings virtually quickly became accustomed to the ability to watch and participate in municipal meetings from the comfort of their own home. As more municipalities and the public became used to hosting and attending virtual meetings, it quickly became commonplace and convenient. The many positive outcomes of these meetings included that people who had never participated in the municipal process in the past were able to watch, listen and comment – estimates suggesting that public engagement actually increased during an otherwise dark time.

Virtual Access Extended

So with the Open Meetings Law fully functioning again, that means all government meetings need to be held in-person again, right?

Not so fast. Earlier this September, Governor Hochul signed legislation extending virtual access to public meetings. This means that meetings can be held remotely again as long as the public has the ability to view or listen to the meetings, and as long as the meeting is recorded and later transcribed.

For municipalities who were hoping for in-person meetings again but enjoyed the increased engagement of virtual meetings, perhaps a compromise with a hybrid style model is the best option.

What Would a Hybrid Style Look Like?

If a municipality were to host a board meeting implementing a hybrid style model, then the meeting could be held in the usual physical meeting spot in addition to on Zoom or another video platform. This way, public engagement could be maximized to its full potential and follow Governor Hochul’s legislation at the same time.[1]

A hybrid style could also address the matter of accessibility and inclusivity. People that don’t have cars or access to transportation could continue to attend virtual meetings and stay in the loop. After all, communities work best when the people living in them and the people leading them work together. Therefore, hybrid-style meetings are a solution to improve outreach, participation, and inclusivity. While the pandemic disrupted most of our lives, municipalities should capitalize on the opportunity to collaborate with the public and find more ways to include everyone.

Questions on how to navigate the Open Meetings Law now that virtual meetings have been extended? Contact us at 631-738-9100.


[1] If a municipality wishes to host a virtual meeting only (without a physical location tied to it), then Governor Hochul’s legislation allows this option.

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

NYS Appoints Cannabis Regulators, Moving Closer to Licensing Regulations

Posted: October 5th, 2021

By: Arthur Yermash, Esq. email

Tags:

Following the legalization of recreational marijuana and Governor Hochul being sworn in, the ball is finally rolling on establishing an Office of Cannabis Management (OCM) in New York State.

The OCM is the regulatory agency that will oversee New York’s legal cannabis industry. On September 1, the New York State Senate convened a special session to confirm Governor Hochul’s nominations: Chris Alexander as Executive Director of the OCM and Tremaine Wright as the Chair of the Cannabis Control Board (CCB). Alexander is a former policymaker for the Drug Policy Alliance and was involved in the creation of the Marijuana Regulation & Taxation Act. Wright is a former Assemblywoman and current Director of the Office of Financial Inclusion and Empowerment in the NYS Department of Financial Services.

OCM Executive Director Alexander’s role will be to oversee applications for licensing and permits for manufacturing, cultivating, processing, settling, storing and distributing cannabis. CCB Chair Wright will be responsible for the number of registrations, licenses and permits to be issued.

The approval of Governor Hochul’s picks means that New York State is moving closer to establishing regulations on cannabis licensing. The state legalized recreational marijuana this past spring after the issue took a backseat to the COVID-19 pandemic. Governor Hochul ordered the special session by saying she wanted “to jumpstart the long-overdue decisions pertaining to establishing cannabis in the state of New York.”

Following the NYS Senate’s special session to appoint New York’s cannabis regulators, on September 22, Governor Hochul announced her Cannabis Control Board member appointments: Ruben R. McDaniel, III and Jessica Garcia. As board members, McDaniel and Garcia will help create and implement the regulatory framework for New York’s cannabis industry. McDaniel is the President and CEO of the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York which provides construction, financing, and allied services. Garcia is Assistant to the President of the Retail, Wholesale Department Store Union, a national labor union representing workers along the food supply chain, as well as workers in non-food retail and healthcare.

The final two members of the five-person Cannabis Control Board include Adam W. Perry, Speaker Carl Heastie’s appointment, and Jen Metzger, Senate Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins’s appointment. Perry is an employment attorney, while Metzger is a former New York State Senator from the 42nd District.

Now that New York’s Cannabis Control Board is officially complete, and the Office of Cannabis Management has a director, that means that the regulatory process of legal marijuana can start to move forward with steps towards licensing, cultivation, production, distribution, sale, and taxation.

Visit our Cannabis Law practice area page to learn more about cannabis regulations, compliance, and licensing. 

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

Hochul Activates NY HERO Act: What Should Employers Do Now?

Posted: September 13th, 2021

By: Arthur Yermash, Esq. email

Tags: ,

This month, Governor Hochul announced that the Commissioner of Health has designated COVID-19 as a “highly contagious communicable disease that presents a serious risk of harm to the public health under New York State’s HERO Act.”

Former Governor Cuomo had previously signed the NY HERO Act into law on May 5, later amending the legislation in three main areas on June 11. The NY HERO Act requires employers to develop airborne exposure prevention plans and communicate them to employees. Under Governor Cuomo, the plans were required to be adopted by August 5 but were not required to be in effect. Now, Governor Hochul’s designation requires that the airborne infectious disease exposure prevention plans be activated by employers and abided by employees.

What Do Employers Need to Do Now?

  1. Employers should understand what the New York State HERO Act entails. As we previously reported, the HERO Act has two main sections governing (1) the development and adoption of a workplace prevention policy for airborne infectious diseases, and (2) the creation of workplace safety committees.
  2. Review the industry-specific templates posted by the New York State Department of Labor in consultation with the New York State Department of Health. 
  3. Ensure their airborne infectious disease exposure prevention plans meet  the NYS DOL and NYS Department of Health minimum standards and model plans.
  4. Communicate the plan to all employees. The prevention plan should be posted in the workplace in a visible location and distributed to all employees.
  5. Lastly, employers and employees should follow their prevention plans and look out for any new guidance from the state.

CMM will continue to provide updates. For guidance on the NY HERO Act or adopting your own prevention plan now that plans must be activated, please contact us. 

For more information on the NY HERO Act, read CMM’s “What Employers Need to Know about HERO Act Obligations” article here.

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

What Employers Need to Know About the New Federal Vaccine Mandate

Posted: September 13th, 2021

By: Arthur Yermash, Esq. email

Tags: ,

On September 9, President Biden announced his six-part plan to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and Delta variant. Among these six points include vaccine mandates for employers with 100+ employees. Here, a look at Biden’s plan and what employers need to know regarding the new vaccine mandates.

All employers with 100+ employees must ensure their workers are vaccinated or tested weekly.

The Biden administration has directed the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to develop a rule requiring all employers with more than 100 workers to introduce regular weekly testing or mandate the COVID-19 vaccine through an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS).

A senior White House official has been quoted as suggesting that any business that does not comply with the new rules could face up to $14,000 in fines per violation; however, whether this ultimately becomes part of the OSHA rules remains to be seen. Companies will have to pay for the testing, but could be allowed to pass the cost on to their employees.

The mandatory vaccine or weekly testing will be implemented and enforced through OSHA’s ETS; however, no regulations have been released yet, which means there are no compliance dates as of this writing. When the ETS is released, it will most likely include similar guidance as the COVID-19 healthcare ETS that became effective this past June. The ETS will most likely supply fact sheets and summaries about the rule as well as implementation presentations and checklists. As for enforcement, OSHA will need to provide inspection procedures to establish uniform enforcement for employers.

OSHA is developing a rule requiring employees to be offered paid time off for vaccination and to recover if they are under the weather post-vaccination.

While earlier this year New York implemented up to four hours of paid leave to receive the COVID-19 vaccine (see DOL details here), OSHA will require employers with more than 100 employees to provide paid time off for the time it takes for workers to get vaccinated or to recover if they are under the weather post-vaccination. This requirement will be implemented through the ETS as well and the details remain to be seen.

Lastly, the plan requires the vaccine for healthcare workers at Medicare and Medicaid participating hospital and healthcare settings.

This action builds on the vaccination requirement for nursing facilities and will apply to nursing home staff as well as staff in hospitals around the country. This includes clinical staff, volunteers, and staff who are not involved in direct patient, resident, or client care.

CMM will continue to provide updates on the implementation of the “Path out of the Pandemic” plan. If you have questions on the new vaccine or testing mandate, please contact us.

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

“I’ll Take That One!”: How “Shopping” for Cases Makes SCOTUS the Most Powerful Branch of Government

Posted: August 18th, 2021

By: Joe Campolo, Esq. email

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During its 2020-2021 term, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 62 cases – a seemingly large number until you consider the nearly 7,000 it rejected. So how do the less than .01 percent of cases make it to the Supreme Court docket? You may think it takes superior scholarship and a little luck
and you’d be right. But sometimes you might just need to give the Justices the exact type of case they ask for.

The Process

Usually, the Supreme Court hears cases that have been decided in either an appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals or the highest Court in a state. Parties petition the Supreme Court to hear a case if they are not satisfied with a lower court’s decision. According to the Department of Justice, the primary means to petition the Court for review is to ask it to grant a writ of certiorari, which is an order issued by the U.S. Supreme Court directing the lower court to transmit records for a case it will hear on appeal. The Supreme Court will hear a case if at least four of the nine Justices agree to grant the petition for certiorari. This is called the “Rule of Four.” If three or fewer agree to grant the petition, then the Court must decline to hear the case.

How Do Justices Choose Which Cases to Grant Certiorari?

Sometimes, Justices might be interested in settling splits on an issue among lower Circuit Courts. This way, if a number of courts reach different conclusions about a law, the Supreme Court can step in and interpret the law and set a precedent for all the courts. Other times, the Court hears cases when they feel that lower courts have disregarded or misapplied Supreme Court precedent and the Justices want to correct it. Justices also choose cases to resolve conflict between federal and state laws. Through published opinions, it’s also not uncommon for Justices to encourage or even invite certain cases.

Wait, the Court Can Ask for Cases?

Yes, in opinions and dissents. Consider the Court’s rejection of Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water in April 2021.

In 1977, the Supreme Court decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison established the precedent that an employer does not need to provide a religious accommodation to an employee that involves undue hardship on the employer. The Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to challenge this 44-year-old precedent when it declined to hear the Small case this spring.

Jason Small had worked as an electrician for over a decade at Memphis Light, but suffered an injury on the job in early 2013 that required him to change roles. Memphis Light offered him another position, which Small accepted, but with concerns that the new position would conflict with the practice of his religion. Small told the company that he attends services on Wednesday evenings and Sundays and asked for a different position or shift. Memphis Light denied the request. Small remained in the new position and used his vacation days when necessary to attend church. Eventually, Small asked to use vacation time on Good Friday, and the company refused. When Small missed work anyway, the company suspended him for two days without pay.

In 2017, Small sued Memphis Light, Gas & Water for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires employers to grant requested religious accommodations unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on them. On the eve of the trial, the District Court granted Memphis Light summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected Small, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito later wrote an opinion dissenting from the denial of the case in which they not-so-subtly voiced their desire for a case to be brought to the Court that could overturn Hardison. In their opinion about the Court’s rejection of Small, in which they referred to Hardison multiple times, Gorsuch and Alito wrote, “There is no barrier to our review and no one else to blame. The only mistake here is of the Court’s own making – and it is past time for the Court to correct it.” Using the medium of a public dissent, Justices Gorsuch and Alito voiced their opinion disagreeing with the other Justices that denied certiorari and advocated for the Court to correct what they deemed to be a past mistake. 

In another published opinion, Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch concurred in the denial of certiorari of a 2020 case, Patterson v. Walgreen Co. However, despite their concurrence, and similar to the Small dissent, the Justices referenced Hardison. Justice Alito wrote, “I agree in the end that this case does not present a good vehicle for revisiting Hardison, but I reiterate that review of the Hardison issue should be undertaken when a petition in an appropriate case comes before us.” Essentially, while the three Justices agreed that Patterson v. Walgreen Co. was not the correct case through which to examine the precedent set by Hardison, they still invited cases that would challenge Hardison to come before the Court as a more appropriate “vehicle.”

History of Using Dissents to Invite Cases

The published dissent in the Small case and the concurrence in the Patterson case in which the Justices encouraged litigants in other cases to come forward that would challenge Hardison is not all that unusual. Justices have used published dissents as a way to show what cases they are looking for as well as solicit future attempts to win the “Rule of Four” needed to accept a case. The use of this practice has varied under different Chief Justices. Publishing dissents to garner support for cases was common under Chief Justice Warren Burger; however, Chief Justice William Rehnquist disliked the practice. Under Chief Justice John Roberts, publishing dissents to identify issues and express hopes for future cases has made a return.

While the Supreme Court doesn’t exactly have slim pickings when deciding which cases merit certiorari, they can encourage cases that challenge or address specific precedents to at least try and claim a spot on the Court’s docket. Therefore, it wouldn’t be surprising for more cases that challenge Hardison to petition the Court until one is finally granted review. Any middle schooler should know that the judicial branch of government can only interpret laws – not enforce them. Even Alexander Hamilton once said that the Judiciary branch would be the weakest of the three branches of government because it had no influence. But the practice of using dissents and majority opinions to ask for certain cases? That sounds like influence.

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

Judicial Dissolution: An Uphill Battle

Posted: August 5th, 2021

By: Patrick McCormick, Esq. email

Published In: The Suffolk Lawyer

Tags: , ,

When drafting limited liability company operating agreements, some variation of the words “The LLC is formed to conduct any lawful business activity” is used to describe the purpose of the entity. The wisdom of this approach was called into question in a recent judicial dissolution proceeding that came before the New York County Commercial Division (Masley, J.). Across the East River, on the very same date, the Commercial Division in Queens also issued a decision in a judicial dissolution proceeding (Livote, J.), involving shareholder oppression in a corporation. These recent decisions serve as a reminder to corporate shareholders and LLC members – and their attorneys – that dissolving a business entity is far more difficult than creating it.

Broad Purpose Clause: Lazar v. Attena LLC[1]

Petitioners Lazar and Sheinbaum commenced a special proceeding pursuant to LLC Law § 702 to dissolve three LLCs: Attena LLC, Hemera LLC, and Nessa LLC, all of which had been formed during the early 2010s. They also sought the appointment of a receiver to wind up the LLCs’ affairs as well as to restrain respondents Mor and Zichron from filing tax returns on the LLCs’ behalf without prior express written consent of the petitioners or the receiver.

In their petition, Lazar and Sheinbaum contended that the sole purpose of the LLCs was to acquire, own, and operate five multi-family properties in Manhattan. All the associated properties were sold by December 2015, rendering the intended purpose of the LLCs moot. Asserting that the LLCs had therefore “run their course,” the petitioners sought judicial dissolution.

LLC Law § 702 provides that “‘[o]n application by or for a member, the supreme court in the judicial district in which the office of the limited liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is [n]ot reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.’ Thus, the court must determine whether it is ‘reasonably practicable to carry on the business’” of the LLC (citing Matter of 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 72 A.D.3d 121 (2d Dep’t 2010). To succeed, the petitioner must establish that “‘(1) the management of the entity is unable or unwilling to reasonably permit or promote the stated purpose of the entity to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing the entity is financially unfeasible.’” Id. at 131.

Upon the Court’s examination, contrary to the petitioners’ assertions, the operating agreements of the LLCs all defined each entity’s purpose as “any lawful business purpose” – not to acquire, own, and operate the properties. The Court noted that the petitioners offered no evidence to support the claim that this general purpose of the LLCs to engage in “any lawful activity” was no longer occurring. The court found that the respective operating agreements did not limit the business purpose of the LLCs and that the petitioners provided no evidence that the LLCs were in “financial turmoil, insolvent, or otherwise cannot meet their debts and obligations” (a second potential basis for dissolution). The Court therefore dismissed the petition, pointing out that “Oppressive conduct is not sufficient.”

Lazar is a sharp reminder that when petitioning for judicial dissolution under LLC Law § 702, a broad purpose clause in an operating agreement will be a potential hurdle that must be overcome. When forming a new company, the last thing business partners want to think about it is dissolving it based on a future disagreement. But the LLC members and attorney should discuss this clause upon the LLC formation, and not treat it as an afterthought.

Shareholder Oppression: Hammad v. Jamal Kamal Corp.[2]

Petitioner Nedal Hammad was the 25% owner (as well as the president) of respondent corporations Maysa Realty Corp. and Jamal Realty Corp. (“Jamal Kamal”), both real estate holding companies. Nedal’s brothers (Jamal, Kamal, Omar, and Samir) owned the remaining 75% of the corporations.  

In February 2017, the brothers made fourteen demands to Nedal regarding company operations. One demand was to stop making payments to Highcrest, another company owned by the brothers, because they thought Nedal was using Highcrest to drain money from the companies to enrich himself. Nedal continued to make payments to Highcrest, making payments for $29,850 from Maysa and $29,975 from Jamal Kamal in March 2017. Later that year, Nedal made distributions of $150,000 from Maysa and $160,000 from Jamal Kamal to himself and the brothers, including Jamal, without their approval. The brothers did not cash the distribution checks. Thereafter, the brothers elected Jamal president. Jamal, as president, retroactively changed the 2017 distributions made to Nedal. Following his removal as president, Nedal filed a petition for judicial dissolution of the companies under BCL § 1104-a.

Additionally, in late 2018, Maysa and Jamal Kamal made distributions of $509,400 and $499,900, respectively. Nedal’s share of these distributions were applied to his outstanding loans that were created by the re-classifications. These distributions were calculated to reduce the balance of Nedal’s loans to zero. Nedal was not notified of the distributions.

Pursuant to Business Corporation Law (BCL) 1104-a, a holder of 20% or more of the shares of a business corporation (which Nedal held) may seek dissolution if “the directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders.” Dissolution also is warranted if “the property or assets of the corporation are being looted, wasted or diverted.”

In determining whether to proceed with involuntary dissolution, the court must take into account (1) “Whether liquidation of the corporation is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their investment; and (2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of any substantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners.”

Here, the Court held that judicial dissolution was not warranted. The removal of Nedal as president did not constitute oppressive conduct. However, no acceptable justification was offered for the reclassification of the payments to Highcrest; although the brothers alleged that Nedal was self-dealing through Highcrest, they did not prove the allegations.

The Court also noted that Nedal’s reasonable expectations as a shareholder were to receive a dividend in proportion to his ownership. The oppressive conduct against Nedal was to remedy what the brothers viewed as his unauthorized and oppressive conduct. After the 2018 distributions were made to “equalize” the distributions among all the shareholders, the Court did not find that any “future oppressive conduct” was intended by the brothers, and Nedal will share in future distributions. Therefore, dissolution would not be an appropriate remedy. Instead, the appropriate remedy was to pay to Nedal the amounts paid to Highcrest that the brothers improperly reclassified as loans.

Hammad is a reminder that courts have a great deal of discretion when determining petitions for judicial dissolution in shareholder oppression suits. Specifically, when majority shareholders are able to continue company operations, judicial dissolution may not be the appropriate remedy; monetary damages for past wrongdoings may be more appropriate. Like Lazar, Hammad reminds us that breaking up can be hard to do.


[1] 2020 WL 5439528 (NY County Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 2020)

[2]2020 WL 5755548 (Queens County Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 2020)

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.

High Bar for Tenants: Court Sides with Landlord in Harassment Case

Posted: July 29th, 2021

By: Patrick McCormick, Esq. email

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Sitting in a rare en banc hearing in Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc.  992 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2021), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the panel determination holding and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims of intentional discrimination under the Fair Housing Act of 1968; Housing Discrimination claims under 45 USCA §§1981 and 1982; Housing Discrimination under NYSHRL; and negligent Infliction of emotional distress.  The Court held that a claim by a tenant “alleging that his landlord failed to respond to reports of race-based harassment by a fellow tenant fails to state a claim for intentional discrimination.”  The Court reasoned that “landlords typically do not, and therefore cannot be presumed to exercise the degree of control over tenants.”

Background

As alleged in the Complaint, Donahue Francis, a Black man, rented and lived in an apartment at Kings Park Manor, an apartment complex owned and operated by defendant Kings Park Manor, Inc. (“KPM”). Throughout 2012, Francis’s neighbor verbally attacked and attempted to intimidate him by making racist insults and at least one death threat. In March 2012, Francis reported his neighbor to the Suffolk County police, who informed KPM of the reported events. Francis renewed his lease “without comment” on May 1, 2012; thereafter, Francis wrote three letters to KPM, in which he recounted his neighbor’s behavior, the police involvement, and his neighbor’s arrest for aggravated harassment in August 2012. However, he did not allege in the complaint that he ever requested any action by KPM. His neighbor pleaded guilty to a charge of harassment in April 2013.

The Complaint

Francis’s Complaint asserted claims of racial discrimination against KPM under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982, and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), as well as a common law claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Complaint also included a breach of contract claim against KPM. KPM moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the motion as to Francis’s breach of contract claim, but otherwise granted it by dismissing Francis’s other claims against KPM.

A divided panel in the Second Circuit issued an opinion affirming the dismissal of Francis’s claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress but reversed the dismissal of his discrimination claims. Rehearing en banc was later ordered.

The Court’s Analysis

The Second Circuit, in a 7-5 en banc ruling, vacated the panel decision and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that “(1) a landlord cannot be presumed to have the degree of control over tenants necessary to impose liability under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant harassment, (2) Francis fail[ed] to state a claim that the KPM defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of the FHA, Civil Rights Act, or the NYSHRL; and, (3) Francis fail[ed] to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against KPM under New York law.”

Because the plaintiff’s claims were not premised on direct evidence of landlord discrimination, the Court analyzed the claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.[1] The Court found the complaint “lacks even ‘minimal support for the proposition’ that the KPM defendants were motivated by discrimination intent” and that “only untethered speculation supports an inference of racial animus of the part of the KPM defendants.” The Court recognized that Francis claimed these allegations establish that defendants intentionally discriminated against him under the “deliberate indifference” theory of liability. The Court held that, even if this theory applied, “Francis has failed to state a claim because his complaint provides no factual basis to infer that the KPM defendants had “substantial control over [the harassing and the context in which the known harassment occur[red].” Nor can such control be reasonably presumed to exist in the typical arms-length relationship between landlord and tenant, unlike the custodial environments of schools and persons.”  

The Court further explained that the typical powers of a landlord over a tenant – such as the power to evict – does not establish the “substantial control” necessary to state a “deliberate indifference” claim under the FHA.

Significantly, the Second Circuit went to lengths to distinguish the Seventh Circuit’s determination in Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018), which “recognized a deliberate indifference theory of liability for a claim of discrimination under the FHH.”  The Second Circuit distinguished Wetzel because there the allegations “gave rise to the plausible inference that the defendant landlord had unusual supervisory control over both the premises and the harassing tenants.” In addition, the Second Circuit found it significant that the landlord in Wetzel “was alleged to have affirmatively acted against the plaintiff.”

The Court also concluded that even if KPM had “substantial control,” Francis would have still failed to state an FHA claim for discrimination under a “deliberate indifference” theory because KPM’s inaction was not “clearly unreasonable” in light of the circumstances described in the Complaint.

Conclusion

While the Court’s decision emphasizes the particular facts in this case, it seems that the Court’s analysis and application of the law to those facts, coupled with its analysis of the Second Circuit’s determination in Wetzel, result in a very high bar for tenants to overcome. The decision also gives significant protections to landlords faced with intentional discrimination claims based on allegations that the landlord failed to respond to allegations of fellow tenant’s race-based harassment.


[1]  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiffs have specific, “reduced” pleading burdens in cases subject to the McDonnell Douglas analysis. For a plaintiff’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, he must plausibly allege that he “(1) is a member of a protected class, . . . (2) suffered an adverse . . . action, and (3) has at least minimal support for the proposition that the [housing provider] was motivated by discriminatory intent.” While plaintiff did allege, “in a conclusory fashion” that the KPM defendants intervened against other tenants regarding non-race related violations of their leases or of the law, the Court held that “there is no factual basis to plausibly involve infer that the KPM defendants’ conduct with regard to Francis was motivated by racial animus.”

The information contained in this article is provided for informational purposes only and is not and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. The firm provides legal advice and other services only to persons or entities with which it has established an attorney-client relationship.