May 2013 Legal Brief – Firm Newsletter
Posted: May 30th, 2013
Posted: May 30th, 2013
Posted: May 29th, 2013
Tags: intellectual property
In a recent decision, Cariou v. Prince1, the Second Circuit held that 25 works of appropriation art that incorporated original copyrighted photographs constituted fair use under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107. Appropriation art is the “more of less direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even an existing work of art.”2
In this action, defendant Prince took Cariou’s photographs and incorporated them into 30 works. Images of the 30 works and the corresponding Cariou photographs used are available through the Second Circuit’s website:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/11-1197apx.htm.
Cariou sued for copyright infringement and the district court granted Cariou summary judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find Prince’s work to be fair use. The Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.
The Second Circuit’s analysis focused on the four non-exclusive fair use factors provided in the Copyright Act: (i) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or for nonprofit educational purposes; (ii) the nature of the copyrighted work; (iii) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (iv) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the value of the copyrighted work.
Under the first standard, the Second Circuit found that 25 of the 30 works were transformative because they “manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs.”3 The court focused on the differences between the two artists’ “composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media.”
Under the second factor, the Second Circuit acknowledged that Cariou’s work was both creative and published, which weighted against a finding of fair use, but noted that this factor is of less importance where, as here, the work is used for a transformative purpose.4
Under the third factor, even though Prince used all or substantially all of Cariou’s photographs in some of his works, the Second Circuit held that this does not necessarily weigh against fair use because the copying of the entirely of a work is sometimes necessary to make a fair use of the image. In this case, Prince’s 25 works transformed Cariou’s photographs into “something new and different.”5
Lastly, under the fourth factor, the Second Circuit focused on whether the secondary work usurps the market of the original work. An alleged infringer usurps the market of the original work and its derivatives when the target audience and the nature of the infringing content are the same as the original. In this case, the Second Circuit found that Prince’s work appeals to “an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou’s” work and that this factor weighs in favor of Prince.6
With respect to five of the 30 works at issue, the Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.
1 Cariou v. Prince, Case No. 11-CV-1197, 2013 WL 1760521 (2d Cir. April 25, 213).
2 Cariou, 2013 WL 1760521, at *2.
3 Id. at *6.
4 Id. at *9.
5 Id. at *10.
6 Id. at *9.
Posted: May 28th, 2013
Please join us on Thursday, July 21 for a complimentary CLE focusing on critical updates to the CPLR and court rules as well as recent case law that significantly impacts New York civil practice and discovery. Taught by two experienced litigators, CMM partners Scott Middleton and Patrick McCormick, the course will cover a wide variety of topics of interest to all who practice in New York State courts including deposition rules, subpoena standards, privilege issues, electronic evidence, and discovery hurdles facing every practitioner.
The application for New York accreditation of this course is currently pending.
A light dinner will be served.
Thursday, July 21, 2016
5:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.
Campolo, Middleton & McCormick, LLP
4175 Veterans Memorial Highway, Suite 400
Ronkonkoma, NY 11779
This seminar is free but registration is required. Please RSVP to Lauren Kanter-Lawrence, Esq., Director of Communications, at Lkanter@cmmllp.com or (631) 738-9100, extension 322.
Posted: May 28th, 2013
Tags: estate planning
Is this a tragic scenario? Probably not, but it certainly represents what is an entirely avoidable estate planning consequence. Here’s the dilemma. Assume after having your first child, you do the smart, responsible thing — you draft a Last Will and Testament which sets forth your final wishes with regard to the distribution of your estate. Fast forward a couple years and say that your first child now has a sibling and that you unintentionally failed to accommodate for in your Will. OK, one last fast forward in time. Twenty-five years later, despite your best intentions and the daily grind always seemingly getting in the way, you find that you never quite got around to updating your Will to reflect your wishes regarding that later born child before you pass away. So much for the best laid plans.
Even though you love your children equally and probably want them to similarly share in your estate, will that actually happen? Will that later born child you omitted from your Will be disinherited because of your planning error, or will the law accommodate her somehow? These are scary questions. It’s my hope to not only calm your fears, but prompt you to action in order to avoid any unwanted estate planning consequences down the road.
If it’s not already abundantly clear, today I’m writing about the inheritance rights of children in New York, and specifically those that are left out of a parent’s estate plan (sometimes referred to pretermitted heirs). For better or worse, it’s more common than you might think that children are left out of a parent’s Will. The good news is that New York State recognizes that drafters sometimes make unintentional planning errors. The legislature has set in place certain rules to ensure that pretermitted children are not precluded from inheriting.
Under New York law, a child omitted from a Will is entitled to inherit the equivalent of his or her intestate share of the estate, which translates into that portion of the estate that he or she would have received had the parent died without a Will in the first place. The only caveat to this rule is that the parent must not have expressly disclaimed or disinherited the child. In New York, short of successfully contesting a Will, testamentary provisions that disinherit an adult child will typically stand. So while disinheriting a child can prove to be the death knell to his inheriting, a simple inadvertent omission won’t typically prove fatal to a child inheriting.
Could the confusion of this entire scenario have been avoided from the get go? Of course, and in particular, there are two ways it could have been achieved. The first method I offer is a simple alternative for those who don’t want to regularly revisit their wills. For anyone planning on having more than one child (and even those who aren’t), a qualified estate planning attorney knows the proper language to include in a Will to accommodate for the possibility of after born children. Consult with counsel and be sure he knows your plans/intentions so that the proper verbiage can be included in your Will. Although this does usually work, it is not my preferred method. It could easily cause resentment between the siblings-either because Mom didn’t love me enough to even bother updating her Will, or the classic, “Mom loved you best.”
The second method I offer is a bit harder to accomplish. As far as I’m concerned, Wills and Estate Plans occasionally need to be revisited and adjusted based on the present conditions of your life. Plain and simple, these adjustments are absolutely necessary as the circumstances in one’s life change, whether it be because of a new child, divorce, retirement, etc. In order to do your heirs justice and make sure that your wishes are carried out, update your Estate Plan as necessary. While it’s easy to be lazy and assume that your existing Will accomplishes all of your intended estate planning goals, don’t make assumptions. It might cost you a little bit extra to revisit your plan on occasion, but it could mean the difference between your wishes being carried out or not.
Posted: May 28th, 2013
The decisions of the current Supreme Court are the friendliest to business of any court since World War II, according to a recent study published in the Minnesota Law Review.
In “How Business Fares in the Supreme Court,” Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner discuss their analysis of nearly 2,000 decisions from 1946 through 2011. The study considered cases with a business on only one side. A vote in favor of the business was considered a pro-business vote.
The authors concluded that five of the ten Supreme Court Justices who have been most favorable to business currently serve on the Court, and two of them, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., ranked at the top of the list of the 36 most pro-business Justices in the study. The study found that after Roberts and Alito were appointed to the Court, the other three conservative Justices became more business-friendly in their decisions. The authors surmise that “the three may not have been as interested in business as Roberts and Alito and decided to go along with them to forge a more solid conservative majority across a broad range of issues.”
In an article about the Minnesota study that appeared earlier this month in the New York Times (http://nyti.ms/19krzbQ), Adam Liptak highlighted two areas in which the Supreme Court has recently exercised its pro-business view: (1) by protecting companies from class action lawsuits, and (2) favoring arbitration to resolve business disputes.
In March, the Court dismissed an antitrust class action that Comcast subscribers brought against the company, finding that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently cohesive as a class to allow the suit to continue as a class action. In that decision, Comcast v. Behrend, the Court affirmed its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, in which the Court threw out a sex discrimination class action brought by a million and a half female employees. As Liptak noted in his article, “[t]he decisions essentially required early scrutiny-by a judge, not a jury-of the ultimate legal question in high-stakes cases [i.e., which party should prevail], sometimes before all the relevant evidence has been gathered.” Business groups, which have sought to limit plaintiffs’ ability to bring class actions, applauded the decision.
The Supreme Court has also given businesses extra protection in the area of dispute resolution. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court found that a form AT&T required its customers to sign requiring the resolution of disputes through arbitration rather than in court was a valid contract. As Liptak notes, this decision empowered businesses by allowing them to shield themselves from class actions by way of arbitration agreements.
According to the Minnesota study, the Roberts Court is far friendlier to businesses than any of its recent predecessors. This blog will trace decisions of import from the Roberts Court and analyze the impact of these decisions on business.
Posted: April 23rd, 2013
Tags: intellectual property
Business owners should be advised that a license is required for any public performance of music. Some owners are unknowingly playing music in their restaurants, bars, gyms, and storefronts from CDs, iPods, or MP3 players in violation of Copyright Laws.
What is needed are public performance rights — the right to play music that the general public will hear in one way or another. Public performance rights licenses are handled by two very large companies named ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers) and BMI (Broadcast Music Incorporated). Each one handles a catalog of about 4,000,000 songs. Their fees depend upon the type of establishment, size, etc.
Further information on how to obtain a license from BMI and ASCAP can be found at:
www.bmi.com/licensing and www.ascap.com/licensing/generallicensing.aspx
The penalty for failing to obtain a license is a potential lawsuit for copyright infringement. Under the Copyright Law, the violator can be subject to sanctions, which can include an injunction and the copyright owner’s actual damages, as well as the infringer’s profits, or statutory damages of up to $30,000 for each copyrighted song performed without a license (up to $150,000 if the infringement is willful). The infringer can also be required to pay the copyright owners’ legal fees. The law further provides for criminal sanctions against those who willfully infringe on a copyright for commercial advantage or private gain.
Being caught without a license is a risk that some establishments are taking every day. The license fees, however, are nominal compared to the potential penalty, if caught. Although music may not be a major part of a business, any public establishments that plays or wishes to play music for their patrons should be aware of the license requirement.
Posted: April 21st, 2013
Copyrighted works imported into the United States from abroad are subject to the same “first-sale” rules as items purchased in the United States, according to a Supreme Court decision issued last month (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697).
Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University and the University of Southern California. While working on his degrees, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition English language textbooks in Thailand, where they were sold at low prices, and mail them to him in the United States, where he then sold the books, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept the profit.
Publisher John Wiley & Sons commenced a copyright infringement lawsuit against Kirtsaeng in 2008, alleging that Kirtsaeng’s resale of the books infringed on Wiley’s exclusive right to distribute under §106(3) of the Copyright Act. Kirtsaeng countered that he had acquired the books legitimately and that the “first-sale” doctrine codified in §109(a) of the Copyright Act allowed him to resell or otherwise dispose of the imported books without permission from the copyright owner.
The first-sale doctrine is a limitation on the exclusive right of copyright owners to distribute copies of their work under the Copyright Act. The first-sale doctrine provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of §106(3) [the section granting the owner exclusive distribution rights], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Kirtsaeng’s defense, therefore, was that although §106(3) forbids distribution of a book without the copyright owner’s permission, once he lawfully obtained a copy, he was free to dispose of it as he wished. Essentially, that “first sale” in Thailand, Kirtsaeng argued, exhausted the copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right under §106(3).
However, the District Court sided with Wiley at trial, finding that the first-sale defense did not apply to “foreign-manufactured goods.” On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed, noting that the first sale doctrine applies only to “the owner of a particular copy . . lawfully made under this title.” According to the Second Circuit, works made abroad could not have been made “under this title” or under American law, and thus the first-sale doctrine was inapplicable.
But the Supreme Court rejected this argument last month, holding that the first-sale doctrine indeed applied to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer noted that the phrase “lawfully made under this title” was not intended to exclude works made overseas. (The Court also observed that “geographical interpretations create more linguistic problems than they resolve.”) Instead, the Court focused on the serious consequences of upholding the Second Circuit’s analysis, such as preventing a buyer in the United States from selling or giving away copies of a foreign film or a dress made abroad, finding that this scenario could not possibly have been the legislative intent.
The Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng affirmatively settled a long ambiguous question as to whether the first-sale doctrine applied to copyrighted works manufactured abroad and imported into the United States. The Supreme Court had previously held in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) that the first-sale doctrine applied to works manufactured in the United States but first sold outside the United States, then imported back. But the Quality King court never resolved the issue ultimately decided in Kirtsaeng as to the more common situation in which copyrighted works manufactured abroad are then imported into the United States.
The Kirtsaeng decision may result in lower prices in the United States on copyrighted works such as books, because publishers can no longer use American copyright law as a basis to sell similar versions of the same work at greatly varying prices depending on the country. But, copyright owners may respond by localizing their offerings in particular markets so that, for example, the English language version of a textbook sold in Thailand would no longer serve as an adequate substitute for the American version of the same book. Others may rely more heavily on encoding products in region-specific formats, so that a DVD purchased in one country will not play on a player in another country. Undoubtedly, although long awaited, the Court’s decision will not be the last word on this issue.
Posted: April 19th, 2013
Tags: estate planning
The quick answer to that question is “yes.” When your child turns 18 years of age, he is considered a legal adult. As such, he should have an estate plan. This includes a health proxy, power of attorney, and even a will or trust. While it is difficult for parents to think about this as being necessary, failure to take these measures can have unexpected or severe consequences. When your child reaches the age of maturity, HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) prevents even you, his parents, from obtaining confidential medical information. He needs to have communicated that he wishes for you to still be involved through HIPAA release documents. Additionally, if your child is unable to communicate his desires for his own medical care (or decisions regarding life support) you would need to be appointed as his health care proxy to make these decisions on his behalf. Otherwise, it could require years of litigation before you can make those types of decisions.
While it may be difficult to do, it is important that you discuss with your young adult their end-of-life wishes. You should know whether or not she wishes to be kept alive by heroic measures, even if it means she would not have a meaningful quality of life. As hard as it may be, you should even discuss with her other issues such as burial preferences, organ donations and cremation. Other important decisions, such as who may receive her important tangible property (her “stuff”) and her financial assets need to be worked out and documented as well.
It is important to note that not every person has the capacity to make decisions. In those cases you, as the parent, must now seek legal guardianship through the courts. You do not have the power to make medical and financial decisions on your child’s behalf without it. But even then, in a situation where your child still has the ability to state her preferences, goals, and objectives, and also supply input as to whom would make her decisions, her input should be considered, even if you are appointed as her guardian.
You should also be aware that often a parent or grandparent has given funds to a minor, and upon the age of 18, these funds are vested and are now owned by this young adult. In the unfortunate event that your child should predecease you, these assets may have to be probated and will pass to that person’s heirs-at-law. Assuming that they don’t have a spouse or child, in New York the next in line are his parents. In many situations, you have set up an estate plan for yourselves divesting assets in order to reduce your estate. This is typically done for estate tax or for asset protection purposes. The unplanned receipt of assets from your child could greatly impact your plan. A straightforward will, directing that the assets be left to individuals other than you, possibly siblings, or a charity, would alleviate this unintended problem.
So, whether it’s to make sure their wishes are being carried out or to further accomplish your planning goals, it may become important for your child to create an estate plan. This usually would simply be a straightforward will, power of attorney, health care proxy and living will. Of course, if your young adult has already accumulated some assets, his or her estate plan may be more complex and require the use of trusts. A qualified estate planning attorney would be able to help create the best plan of action.
Posted: April 10th, 2013
By Patrick McCormick
Suppose you are a landlord and lease space, commercial or residential, to an individual tenant. Tenant timely pays rent for a while but, suddenly, rent payments stop. Upon investigating, you learn that the tenant has died. Does the death terminate the lease? Is a nonpayment proceeding available to obtain possession of the premises?
While not a common occurrence, this simple fact pattern raises several issues regarding when, and against whom, a nonpayment proceeding may be brought.
Initially, while perhaps not well known, but certainly well settled, the death of a tenant does not terminate an unexpired lease or the tenant’s leasehold estate. In such situations, generally, the executor, administrator or legal representative is permitted to remain in possession of the demised premises until the expiration of the lease.
Under our facts, how can the landlord obtain possession of the premises? The answer lies buried in RPAPL §711(2). The last sentence of RPAPL §711(2) provides: “Where a tenant dies during the term of the lease and rent due has not been paid and no representative or person has taken possession of the premises and no administrator or executor has been appointed, the proceeding may be commenced after three months from the date of death of the tenant by joining the surviving spouse or if there is none, then one of the surviving issue or if there is none, then any one of the distributes.”
In Poulakas v. Ortiz a nonpayment proceeding was commenced against respondent, the son of the deceased rent-stabilized tenant. In this case, it was not disputed that there was no administrator, executor appointed or surviving spouse of the tenant; that 3 months had elapsed from the date of death of the tenant before commencement of the nonpayment proceeding; and, the lease had not yet expired. In moving to dismiss, among other things, the respondent argued that he occupied the premises and therefore the statute was inapplicable causing the Court to examine the portion of the statute that provides “and no representative or person has taken possession of the premises . . .”
In denying the motion, the Court held that this phrase “should be construed as meaning that there is no person either in possession of the premises on behalf of the estate of legally authorized to act on behalf of the estate.” The Court specifically found that “the legislature did not intend that the ‘deceased tenant’ section of §711(2) be applied only in situations where the premises are vacant, as this would limit the remedial nature of the statute.”
Thus, when a tenant dies, a little investigation by the landlord is necessary to determine the date of death and whether an administrator or legal representative of an estate of the deceased tenant has been appointed and, if not, to identify the “issue” or distributes. Once this investigation is completed, a landlord is able to commence a nonpayment proceeding to obtain possession of leased premises. The Court’s analysis of the issues in Poulakas is must reading.
1 Dolan, Rasch’s New York Landlord and Tenant including Summary Proceedings, �32:12 (4th ed); Marine Terrace Associates v. Kesoglides, 24 Misc.3d 35 (App. Term 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, 2009)
2 25 Misc.3d 717 (NYC Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 2009)